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Abstract 
 
Recent crises show clearly that Europeans security depends on external developments. The Common Security 
and Defense Policy failed to provide security, while the European Union military missions were limited in 
terms of their scope. This inability threatens the interests and security of the member states. Exactly, this 
research explores the concept of military power of the EU. In order to elaborate anatomy of military power of 
the EU, the descriptive-analytic method is used. Military performance analysis proves that the EU is able to 
have the greatest impact in the global arena. The research shows that with the achievement of a political 
strategy among the stakeholder, on which the replacement of the consensus mechanism with an ordinary 
majority is predicted, the EU would be able to lead a proactive and efficient security policy. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Having received the Nobel Peace prize in 2012 for decades of work, the European 
Union stands out on the world stage to be the main promoter of dialogue as a tool to solve 
conflicts., wars and not to mention the historical divisions that have followed the European 
continent with their violence affected citizens and European policy makers to use force 
only as a last resort. In retrospect, built on the ruins of World War II, protected by shields 
and the will of the United States of America, with the sole intent to drive back the Soviets, 
the EU saw the light of day, because it was able to re-establish itself somehow avoiding 
military question. On the other hand, with Germany and France in the heart of the Union, 
which had fought each other it was inconceivable that these two great military powers, can 
describe future together in a common army. Geostrategic transformations that have resulted 
from the end of the Cold War oblige us to analyze some facts and above all, to review the 
current situation in a more realistic way. Europe is facing many challenges in a world that 
is changing at a high speed; all the issues require a joint international response. The latest 
crisis in Ukraine, the risk of conflict of Syria and the need for protection from terrorism, 
dramatically shows the extent to which the welfare, safety and quality of life of Europeans 
depend on external developments. The EU should be a more effective global actor, ready to 
share responsibility for global security and take the lead in defining common responses and 
challenges but this cannot be achieved if the Union does not have a simple juristic 
mechanism that will not protect the interests of the close states but the geostrategic interests 
of the Union itself.  
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The crisis in Ukraine and Syria openly displayed weakness of the EU on military 
matters. Although a decade ago the EU had provided that in case of crisis it will settle one 
to two thousand troops. Therefore it is clear that Europe, after leaving the problem for 
decades, now it is forced to take up its responsibilities. Hill argues that if the EU wants to 
become more convincing actor in the international arena, the gap should be closed, which 
means that European foreign policy should be indicated in its behavior, and not in 
aspirations and views. (Martinsen 2006, 1-2). This research examines the background of the 
demand for an independent army and European power, after the massacre of the Yugoslav 
wars and new challenges that threaten the continent. The Ukraine crisis and that of Syria, 
not to mention the rest, make Europe today to reconsider its approach on security and above 
all, to restore the fundamental issue, its future and its existence. However, this would be 
impossible if there will not become profound changes within the legal mechanisms of the 
EU. 
 
A LITTLE BACKGROUND:  
EFFORTS TO CREATE THE EU MILITARY POWER 
 
If we look back, the security and defense are the main topic of discussion during 
the EU project. For much of the European Union’s existence, acquisition of a military 
power had been a strictly intangible concept. The French Government of Rene Pleven, was 
concerned by the resurgence of possible German militarism, in February 1951, in Paris, 
opened a conference on the establishment of Community Protection, including a 'European 
army'1 which will never enter into force, because the French National Assembly refused to 
ratify (30 August 1954) after the French Communist Party and the Gaullist Party voted 
against. (Gеorge and Bache 2001, 69). At the time this initiative was considered as 
premature, and this failure dragged the project for an indefinite time. Although launched a 
number of successive initiatives during the Cold War, security and defense remained 
largely the domain of NATO and the United Nations. There had long been plans for a 
European Defense Community, for example, a pan-European collective mainly aimed 
towards countering a potentially unified Germany. However once West Germany joined 
NATO in 1955 these plans quickly fell from the agenda. Many attempts to introduce 
defense to the European agenda would follow the same pattern; initial enthusiasm before 
being disregarded. The Maastricht treaty saw the first concrete move towards the ratifying 
of an EU mission; containing an explicit reference to the framing of a joint defense policy 
but limited explanations of how this would be achieved. The Yugoslav Wars concentrated 
minds and led the EU to truly assess and question its military ineptitude for the first time. 
The brutality, media images of the appalling human rights abuses and enormous number of 
fatalities produced a harsh impetus for the move towards a concrete policy. The Amsterdam 
Treaty of 1995 was introduced as a direct response to the events in Yugoslavia and proved 
to be the most concrete strategy towards a militarized Europe. It created common strategies 
on key regions, greater capacity to act and more control over foreign policy instruments.  
The headline goal was the establishment of the European Security and Defensive 
Policy which would be expanded by the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 to incorporate both input 
from both the council and the commission. A decisive component, likely introduced to 
                                                          
1
 Rene Pleven proposed the creation of a European army which would include 14 French divisions, 12 German, 11 Italian 
and three from Benelux countries with a common command. 
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appease the member states sense of sovereignty, was the “emergency brake”, enabling 
states to voice opposition on the grounds of national interest. (Pipes 2014).  
With the birth of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in Saint-Malo 
in 1998, the Union has committed more than 20 crisis management operations, six of them 
militarily. It also adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in 2003 and its update in 
2008, which was the missing link that gave purpose and direction sense CSDP (Martinsen 
2009, 2). 
 
THEORETICAL APPROACH: 
HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE EU MILITARY POWER? 
 
There are many definitions about “power”. It derives from the military power: the 
ability to use force. Having powerful resources such as raw materials, population, territory, 
economic power, military force, does not necessarily translate into “power” i.e. the ability 
to attain the outcome one wants. (Rois-Smith 2009, 279-280). Karen Smith outlines some 
instruments with which an actor can influence other actors: the use of persuasion, offering 
prizes, awards, threats. This definition is according to traditional principles. Joseph S. Nye 
distinguishes between two types of power: hard and soft. “Hard power” stems from military 
and economic strength and its characteristic is the use of “carrot” or “stick”. “Hard power” 
is characterized by traditional state instruments, use of force and bribery. On the other hand 
“Soft power”, is attractive, you force others to love the exact results that you want. (Ilik 
2012, 82-83). The power of an actor depends on his ability to be a leading-example. If other 
actors respect and join his aspirations, then there is no need to use impacts and threats. 
“Soft power” can be derived from cultural and political values of a country. When the 
culture of a country includes universal values and its policies and promotes the values and 
interests that others receive, all this increases the likelihood of winning the desired results, 
due to attractive relations. (Haara 2013).  Karen Smith suggests that this kind of actor uses 
and depends on military means to influence other actors, who wants unilateral military 
conclusion and foreign policy which is not democratic. Huntington believes that the use of 
military force is anti-humanitarian, whose purpose is to kill people in the most efficient 
manner. Huntington thinks about the purpose of the military power, its capacity should be 
used for humanitarian activities and other civic activities, but the military should not be 
engaged or be trained to perform such a role. (Krohn 2009). According to these definitions, 
only a dictatorial state could qualify as a pure military power, such as North Korea. But in 
this group we can also introduce US, due to its high military budget and unilateral actions 
in international relations. In addition, it is still reasonable to apply the concept of military 
power, because the role of military engagement as a whole seems to be changing in a new 
concept. The idea of territorial defense has changed into new idea. The EU as a whole does 
not have single army to ensure its protection. Consequently, the influence of Brussels is 
based mainly on the strength of its “soft”, its capacity to influence without obligation. 
Therefore, moving away from the concept of the EU as a clean civilian power; is it possible 
to regard the EU as a military force, but in the new sense? 
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
OPERATIONS 
As part of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the EU has launched 
several operations on her part about military crisis management and civil rights. Here is a 
brief overview of the main elements of the legal framework on operations in the Lisbon 
Treaty. This means that civilian and military operations found their way into the primary 
legislation of the EU as a liability and legal obligation. (Vooren et al. 2013). Under Article 
42 (1) of the Lisbon Treaty, “the common security policy and defense,” gives the Union the 
operational capacity based on civil and military assets. The Union may use them on 
missions outside the EU for maintaining peace, conflict prevention and strengthening 
international security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter”. These missions 
are defined by Article 43 of this Treaty; they “shall include joint disarmament operations, 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and 
peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making 
and post-conflict stabilization” and can “contribute to the fight against terrorism, including 
the support of the third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.” (Naert 2011). 
We can only note that since 2009 and the Lisbon Treaty, Europe has not moved 
forward much on this strategic file. Actually, Lisbon constitutes a notable progression after 
Maastricht (1993, creation of the CFSP) and Saint-Malo (propositions for a European 
Policy of Security and Defense, CSDP, 1998) by introducing an important clause, that of 
mutual Defense, which formally ensures the assistance of other Union members if a state is 
the object of aggression. With these increased powers, the European Defense Agency 
(EDA) ensures better coordination than before, which the Permanent Structured 
Cooperation now complements. But such a commitment does not really equal a global 
strategy, and these commendable advances are insufficient to provide Europe the status of 
superpower, which would enable it to affect the order of things and to ensure that 
tomorrow’s world is a better world. (Blin 2015). 
 
THE MILITARY INTERVENTION AND ITS CAPACITY 
 
However, as we already mentioned above, certain responsibilities of the EU 
include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks in military combat and 
crisis management, including peacemaking. On 31 March 2003, the EU launched its first 
military operation - peacekeeping mission in Macedonia. Operation 'Concordia' with 357 
troops deployed (by all EU members except Ireland and Denmark, as well as 14 other 
countries - an average of 13 soldiers who took part by a Member State) in a small mountain 
country such as Macedonia, and successfully they kept the peace after the conflict in 2001. 
This was a big operation with political and modest symbolism compared to military size. 
By 2010, however, the EU launched a total of 27 missions in 16 countries on three 
continents. It is important to note that, from 27 missions, only six include military force. 
The EU has shown that it can deploy military forces in different variants. 7000 
peacekeepers were sent to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2004 and constitute the greatest 
strength that has ever been located. In 2003, 2000 troops were deployed in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, without the help from NATO, which demonstrated the EU's ability to 
fight high-intensity battles against large rebel forces. 3700 soldiers were deployed to 
protect refugee camps in Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008 showed the EU's 
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ability to overcome major challenges and logistical challenges of ecological environment. 
Anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia shows that the EU takes a leading role in the 
maritime operation with many other countries (including those of NATO) that are 
coordinated from the headquarters of the EU. But despite the military capabilities proven in 
the field, the 'foot' of the EU military is not the main purpose of ESDP. (Hill and Smith 
2011, 207-208). This is the first time that the EU has “military force”, which means that it 
is prepared for military actions. Even if the EU has achieved its own independent military 
ability, the question arises whether the member states will ever agree on any joint 
intervention? Humanitarian mission in Somalia issued in a state of war or mission in 
Congo, in which the Union participated directly in military frontal battle without the help of 
NATO. All this implies that the inclusion of the EU staff in the battle front clearly rejects 
the concept of the EU, as a civil pure power. However, the situation would have been 
different, if there were a single European army. Europe as a military force will end their 
ability to challenge the American power on its continent, but also in the Caucasus and 
Africa. A related question is that, if the EU has reached its own independent military 
capability, will the Member States ever agree for any joint intervention? 
 
WAR AND DIPLOMACY REMAIN STATE FRANCHISE 
 
The rhetorical question of the former US secretary Henry Kissinger “[w]hom do I 
call if I want to call Europe,” has expressed a lack of interaction and identity of the EU’s 
Foreign Policy. Unfortunately, the practical experience proved this in many crises as in the 
former Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, all these showed real deep differences resulting 
share of the EU countries regarding the Foreign Policy and Security (CFSP). The EU 
remains a special and unique body of its kind, it does not work at the political level, 
according to classical schemes known as confederation or federation (like the US, 
Germany, Switzerland or Russia), in which foreign policy is exclusive federal jurisdiction 
and the role of federated states is limited. Although in a wide range of policy areas, the 
member states of the EU have a shared decision-making mechanism, thus significantly 
simplifying the construction of the compromise, the foreign policy does not work according 
to this reality. In the field of foreign policy, dominated by the concept of sovereignty and 
independence where the historical and geopolitical interests of the nations take advantage, 
the political game, requires support from all member states, the Brussels institutions have a 
simplistic role. Diplomacy, as well as war, remains a state completely exclusive and 
evaluated essentially as national sovereignty. The history of the EU operation has shown 
that the more files strengthen their political character, the more deepen interstate conflicts 
(the war in Iraq in 2003, military intervention in Mali in 2013, Syria in 2013, the issue of 
Kosovo, in which 5 Member States refuse its recognition, not to mention arguments over 
enlargement policies, etc.). The members’ political views are different from each other 
which generate disagreements. 
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THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS: 
THE NEED FOR A HISTORICAL STRATEGY 
 
           The research question is whether the EU has managed to have a military force that 
meets its needs? Any military activity is likely to acquire a majority vote if not total support 
and so states’ various vested interests and general foreign policy positions are likely to 
collide, for example, Germany’s legendary pragmatism clashing with Britain’s occasional 
notions of itself as a spreader of democracy.  
           Various mechanisms created over the years, that are affecting the foreign policy of 
the EU, have been assessed as ineffective for the complete fulfillment of this framework. 
Security Policy and the Common Defense, operates with a unanimous vote, which was 
never put into question, as long as there is no willingness to move to a qualified majority 
vote, to define a common foreign policy efficiently. The historical background of the crisis 
and conflicts has shown that national preferences take priority over those of Europe. 
Missing the political will, even the Lisbon Treaty failed to intervene in the political essence 
of this kind of functioning. The consensus among Member States was not to discuss this 
point. Creating a unifying mechanism would make possible the unification of attitudes of 
the Member States of the union in a single position. However, the Treaty of Lisbon enabled 
creating of some mechanisms to improve the decision-making process: the creation of the 
post of President of the Council; Office of the High Representative of the EU and the 
European Diplomatic Service Office. With the goal, the establishment of a functioning real 
political field, which will allow the strengthening of the European role in the international 
arena, the European countries should consider historical strategy that would make it easier 
EU participation in military conflicts. The proposed configurations, although appearing as a 
political necessity for strengthening the role of the EU diplomatic influence and its 
credibility in the international scene, it depends largely on consensus and finding a common 
political will. As long as we are dealing with a missing political will, the EU's diplomatic 
voice will be represented by following national interests that will prevail over European 
ones. The actual European crisis re-creates the same functional scheme. (Dita, 2014).  
          However, without a serious political strategy of Member States, without a common 
foreign policy without a military structure which will serve as an instrument of this 
strategy, Europe is not only doomed to play a secondary role, but above all, put their safety 
at risk by disturbing instability of regions like the Middle East which has already had 
consequences on the European continent. To overcome this important step for the Union 
itself political difficulties are great. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
            The former Belgian Prime Minister Marc Eysken metaphorically described the 
European Communities as an economic giant, political dwarf and military worm. This 
metaphor points to the fact that it is an economic actor, but on the other hand it is not able 
to be aggressive player in the military, because of foreign policy, which cannot form 
political strategic and moves with one voice. The EU appears as a “multi-perspective” 
actor, which is “under construction”. It is developing as the integration process continues. 
So, as a result of this, the EU cannot be seen as a defined entity, but that changes and grows 
in its character and scope. This gives hope that the EU could change its future in the 
military. By the end of the Cold War until now the EU is working out how to take its place 
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in the new world order as a powerful actor.  The Union does not want to be in the shadow 
of other powerful actors in the world. Therefore, the construction of a joint military 
structure is a vital issue for the future of the European Union.  In fact, a quick look at the 
current military landscape in Europe tells us much about the absence of a common vision 
and the lack of interoperability between national forces. A related question is that, if the EU 
has reached its own independent military capability, will the Member States ever agree for 
any joint intervention? Any military activity is likely to get a majority vote but hard to track 
the positions of consensus and general foreign policy is likely to collide. Due to this, the 
EU needs a strategy in a historic decision that will enable the EU to intervene militarily 
without the consent of the Member States but with a simple majority, in cases when the 
continent will be threatened or felt threats within and outside Europe. Among other things, 
it would prevent the genocide, would defend itself from terrorist threats would provide 
security together with other global actors. It is a fact that Europe has often failed when it 
has been confused due to the inability of member states to coordinate and agree with each 
other. If it does not want to be a victim of external threats, Europe needs an efficient army. 
Therefore a European military force would be effective if it prevented conflicts within its 
territory and at the same time if it was necessary to intervene in other countries of the 
world, without being hindered by legal mechanisms. 
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